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Firms in developing countries face numerous and serious 
constraints on their growth, ranging from corruption 
to lack of infrastructure to inability to access finance. 
Countries lack the resources to remove all the constraints 
at once and so would be better off removing the most 
binding one first. 
   This paper uses data from World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys in 2006 –10 to identify the most binding 
constraints on firm operations in developing countries. 
While each country faces a different set of constraints, 
these constraints also vary by firm characteristics, 
especially firm size. Across all countries, access to finance 
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department to develop new practical insights as to how African countries can significantly improve their production of 
light manufacturing products. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The author may be contacted at HDinh@worldbank.org.  
is among the most binding constraints; other obstacles 
appear to matter much less. This result is robust for all 
regions. 
   Smaller firms must rely more on their own funds to 
invest and would grow significantly faster if they had 
greater access to external funds. As a result, a low level 
of financial development skews the firm size distribution 
by increasing the relative share of small firms. The results 
suggest that financing constraints play a significant part 
in explaining the “missing middle”—the failure of small 
firms in developing countries to grow into medium-size 
or large firms. 
The Binding Constraint on Firms’  
Growth in Developing Countries 
 








1.  Introduction 
Private sector growth remains one of the main challenges facing developing countries in their quest 
for development and poverty reduction. Extensive evidence shows that a favorable business 
environment helps promote the growth of firms. As shown in recent research, however, firms in 
developing countries face a tougher business environment than their counterparts in the developed 
world.  
Our aim in this paper is twofold. First, we seek to go beyond the traditional menu of constraints on 
firm growth to find out which of these constraints is the most binding. As the growth diagnostics 
approach points out, developing countries have scarce resources and therefore need to focus on 
removing the most binding constraint. Second, we examine the effects of the most binding 
constraint on firm growth not only across countries but also by firm characteristics. 
We first explore the relationship between the business environment and firm growth as measured by 
employment growth. Among 15 components of the business environment, we identify the most 
binding constraint using both subjective and objective measures. Our focus is on the most binding 
constraints for existing firms and, more specifically, the binding constraint that matters the most for 
firm growth. The methodology follows two steps. The first is to find out which constraints are 
statistically significant among all regressions after controlling for firm characteristics and country 
fixed effects. The second is to identify the most binding constraint. We find that besides informal 
sector competition, access to finance is the obstacle that matters the most for growth. This result is 
robust for all regions and all sectors. 
Our analysis contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, using a large sample, 
containing more than 39,000 firms across 98 countries, we identify the most binding constraint on 
firms using subjective measures, then evaluate the importance of this constraint to firm growth using 
objective measures and controlling for firm characteristics. The sample comes from World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys conducted in 2006–2010 in mostly emerging and developing countries. The 
surveys provide both subjective data on perceived obstacles and objective measures of many 
constraints.  
Second, we investigate the effect of financial access variables on firm growth by using firm-level 
regressions across countries controlling for the effects of different firm sizes, firm ages, sectors, and 
regions. Our results show that having access to finance in the form of a loan, sales credit, or external 
finance helps micro firms the most. This finding holds not only for the full sample but also for 
different regions. Sales credit is important only to micro and small firms, probably because it 
substitutes for bank loans. Having a loan or overdraft facility and receiving external finance for 
investment help growth for firms of all sizes across regions.  
Third, we find clear evidence that a low level of financial sector development affects the firm size 
distribution and therefore contributes to the phenomenon of the “missing middle” in developing 
countries. Firm size distribution is skewed toward small and medium-size firms—and more so in 3 
 
Africa, among firms that are credit constrained, and among firms that perceive access to finance as 
an obstacle. Our analysis shows that firm size and age are significantly correlated with firm growth. 
Distinguishing between different types of ownership, we find that firms tend to have higher growth 
if they are an exporter, are part of entities with multiple establishments, are foreign owned, or are 
privately owned.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature and shows how this paper 
relates to it. Section 3 presents an overview of the data and describes the sample used. Section 4 
examines the most binding constraint of the business environment. Section 5 examines the effect of 
access to finance on employment growth in the full sample and by region, while section 6 looks at 
determinants of access to finance. Section 7 investigates differences in the effect of financial access 
variables on employment growth, and section 8 looks at the relationship between firm size and 
financial constraints. The last section concludes. 
2.  Literature Review 
 
Understanding the firm growth process is important for designing appropriate policies for job 
creation and pro-poor growth. Many studies are devoted to understanding the determinants of firm 
growth, especially employment growth. Most of these studies focus on the manufacturing sector and 
large firms (Evans 1987a, 1987b; Hall 1987; Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson 1989). They find that 
firm age and firm size are important in the analysis of firm growth.  
 
2.1   Effect of the Business Environment on Firm Growth 
 
A number of recent studies use World Business Environment Survey data (a firm-level data set 
covering 4,000 firms across 54 countries) to study the effect of the business environment on firm 
growth. Using subjective, firm-level data on the business environment, some of these studies show 
the importance of finance, corruption, and property rights (Batra, Kaufmann, and Stone 2003; 
Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2006). Others examine the relationship between the 
business environment and firm growth in individual countries or a small group (Dollar, Hallward-
Driemeier, and Mengistae 2005 in Bangladesh, China, India, and Pakistan; Fisman and Svensson 
2007 and Reinikka and Svensson 2002 in Uganda; Bigsten and Söderbom 2006 in Africa).  
 
Other studies also assess the effect of different dimensions of the business environment on firm 
growth. Some focus on the importance of access to finance for firm development and growth using 
subjective data (Rajan and Zingales 1998; Galindo and Micco 2007). Others investigate the impact of 
employment regulations on firm creation and growth (Djankov and others 2002; Klapper, Laeven, 
and Rajan 2004).  
 
Several papers have emphasized the importance of financing obstacles. Using firm-level data, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) provide evidence on the importance of the financial system 
and legal enforcement on firm growth. Rajan and Zingales (1998) present supporting evidence on 4 
 
the role of external finance for faster growth in countries with better developed financial systems. 
These papers focus on only a small set of obstacles that firms confront without discussing the 
motivation for choosing that set.  
 
It is essential to explore the relationship between the business environment and firm growth not 
only across countries but across regions and by firm characteristics within countries—by firm size, 
age, sector, and ownership type. In examining this relationship, the literature has focused largely on 
the effect of difficulties in access to finance by firm type, particularly firm size. Generally the finding 
is that smaller firms are more constrained (Love and Mylenko 2003; IDB 2007). Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005), using the World Business Environment Survey data set, include 
measures of corruption and property rights. Based on firms’ perceptions of potential constraints, 
they also find patterns across countries, with small firms benefiting the most from greater financial 
and institutional development.  
 
Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier, and Pagés (2007, 2009, 2010) analyze the effect of several aspects of 
the business environment—access to finance, corruption, and regulations—on the growth of firms. 
Their findings show that the business environment affects small, medium-size, and large firms 
differently. The reason is that small firms are exposed to a different set of constraints than large 
firms are. Access to electricity, for example, has heterogeneous effects: small and medium-size firms 
are often affected by power cuts, while large and micro firms tend not to be. The main reason is that 
micro firms use less energy-intensive tools and large firms are more likely to secure their own energy 
supply (Gelb and others 2007). Thus infrastructure such as the electricity grid affects the growth rate 
of small and medium-size firms directly, but has only an indirect effect on the growth rate of micro 
and large firms. Micro firms are much more credit constrained and must rely less on external funds 
to finance investment. Improving access to finance might boost the entry rate and the growth of 
small firms, perhaps at the expense of larger incumbents.  
 
According to Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier, and Mengistae (2005), improving the business 
environment is an important complement to trade policies aimed at increasing international trade 
integration. Factors such as fast customs clearance times, good infrastructure, and availability of 
financial services have a significant impact on the probability of a firm’s exporting and receiving 
foreign investment. Freund and Rocha (2010) provide more evidence of the link between the 
business environment and international trade. Using data from Africa, they find that even though 
poor trade infrastructure is one of the main obstacles to trade, most of the burden is due to heavy 
“red tape,” bureaucratic customs practices that increase the time and cost of trade. 
 
Gelb and others (2007) use subjective data on the business environment from 26 African countries 
to show that perceived constraints are not always independent of scale. Complaints about access to 
finance and land are more common among small firms, while complaints about infrastructure and 
corruption are more evenly distributed. They also find that a country’s level of development strongly 
determines which constraints are present (country fixed effects are more important than within-5 
 
country variations). This finding is shared by the World Bank’s Africa Competitiveness Report 2009, 
which shows that as a country’s income rises, its set of constraints changes.  
 
All these studies share a common result: business environment variables affect firms’ growth, in the 
expected direction. The results are heterogeneous by firm size, and they are robust. 
 
2.2   Financial Development and Firm Size Distribution 
 
A common finding in the literature is that the firm size distribution in developing countries is 
skewed toward small and medium-size firms. Small firms are often credit constrained and cannot 
borrow to engage in productive investments, which limits their growth and can prolong the 
skewness. If lack of access to finance prevents small firms from growing, the allocation of resources 
will be distorted. Capital and labor will not be able to flow to where they are most productive, and 
growth will suffer.  
 
Cooley and Quadrini (2001) and Cabral and Mata (2003) present different models of firms’ growth, 
showing that capital constraints can cause a skewness in the firm size distribution. Their prediction 
is verified empirically. Cabral and Mata (2003) find that the size distribution of firms is skewed 
toward small firms and that the skewness decreases with firm age. Many subsequent papers confirm 
the skewness of the firm size distribution, such as Angelini and Generale (2008), Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2005), and Desai, Gompers, and Lerner (2003).  
 
Desai, Gompers, and Lerner (2003) find that in countries with less developed capital markets, the 
firm size distribution is significantly more skewed. They also find that a better legal environment 
favors entry (more small firms will enter) while the growth of small firms reduces the skewness. 
Angelini and Generale (2008) and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) find that capital-
constrained firms grow more slowly than their counterparts.  
 
2.3   Growth Diagnostics Approach 
The growth diagnostics approach proposed by Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco (2005) (hereafter, 
the HRV approach) provides a theoretical framework to identify the most binding constraints on 
economic growth in general. This methodology recognizes that constraints on the growth of a 
developing economy are numerous and that previous approaches to reforms and growth are either 
unrealistic (as with wholesale reform that attempts to eliminate all obstacles at the same time) or 
wrong (by hoping to do as many reforms as possible, the current prevailing approach goes against 
the principle of second best). 
 
The HRV approach is based on the theory of second best (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956). According 
to this theory, if there are many distortions in the economy, fixing any one distortion would not 
necessarily lead to a better Pareto outcome. The HRV approach shows that if there are many 
distortions, whether removing one growth constraint will have a positive effect on growth depends 6 
 
on the interaction effects and coefficients of the other constraints. In the face of uncertainty about 
these effects, Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco recommend a practical approach based on removing 
the most binding constraint, with the “most binding constraint” defined as the one with the largest 
effect where issues of second-best effects are likely to be minimal.  
2.4   This Study’s Contribution to the Literature 
 
In this paper, based on the HRV approach, we investigate the most binding constraint on the 
growth of firms, with the “most binding constraint” defined as the one with the largest estimated 
coefficient across all models and across regions and sectors. Compared with studies using the World 
Business Environment Survey data set, our paper uses a much larger sample. And while other 
studies use subjective firm responses as measures of the business environment at the firm level, we 
also include objective measures, in part to deal with endogeneity and in part to avoid measurement 
errors of perceptions at the country level.  
 
In exploring the relationship between the business environment and firm growth, we go beyond 
distinguishing effects by firm size. We look closely at the effect of financial access variables—loan, 
credit constraint, sales credit, and external investment finance—on firm growth by firm size and age 
in different sectors and regions. We combine multiple financial access variables in a single regression 
in addition to evaluating the effect of each variable on employment growth controlled for firm size, 
age, and other characteristics. This allows an understanding of the impact of each dimension of 
finance on firm growth as firm characteristics change. 
 
Moreover, our paper emphasizes which element of the business environment matters most for 
firms, especially for small firms. And it analyzes how different financial access variables affect the 
firm size distribution across regions and sectors.  
 
3.  Data 
In this paper we use a newly available firm-level data set from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. 
The surveys cover more than 100,000 firms across more than 120 economies and six regions during 
2006–10. We use a sample of 39,538 firms in 98 countries for which data are complete. The unit in 
the sample is the establishment; one firm may have more than one establishment. For simplicity, we 
use the term firms throughout the paper, though the analysis is based on establishment data. 
Our outcome variable of interest is employment growth, measured by the number of permanent 
employees. Our policy interest is in understanding the determinants that are important to the long-
term business operation and employment growth of firms.
2 Because there are no data on temporary 
                                                            
2 Like other researchers, we use employment growth rather than sales growth, for several reasons. Sales growth is more 
volatile and is also more prone to reporting and measurement biases, especially when survey respondents are reporting 
sales realized three years before. Moreover, for tax reasons, firms may not choose to report actual sales.  7 
 
employees collected three fiscal years before the survey fiscal year, we focus on permanent full-time 
employees rather than general full-time employees.  
The firm growth rate is calculated as the log difference between the current number of employees 
and the number of employees three fiscal years before the survey fiscal year. The formula for 
employment growth is as follows: 
        l n      l n    ,    /3 
where     is firm size, and       employment growth, for firm i at time t.
3  The description and 
summary statistics for the employment growth variable are reported in table 1.  
World Bank Enterprise Surveys are conducted to provide information on different aspects of the 
business environment and the performance of firms. The core questionnaire, which contains survey 
questions answered by business owners and top managers around the world, provides both 
subjective and objective information on the business environment that firms confront. The 
questionnaire includes a section asking firms to rank 15 components of the business environment, 
indicating which represent the biggest obstacles, and to evaluate these 15 components on a scale of 
0–4 (0 being no obstacle, 1 a minor obstacle, 2 a moderate obstacle, 3 a major obstacle, and 4 a very 
severe obstacle). Summary statistics for the related variables are provided in table 1.  
These subjective evaluations show the severity of obstacles across regions and countries. This makes 
it possible to identify the top obstacles and examine which obstacles firms consider to be the most 
important. But because the data are subjective—reflecting entrepreneurs’ perceptions of the impact 
of the business environment on firm operation, with successful entrepreneurs perhaps likely to 
consider the business environment to be less restrictive—we need to control for firm characteristics 
in explaining firm growth. In addition, we need to include objective measures of business 
environment constraints.  
The World Bank Enterprise Surveys provide a large set of objective measures of business 
environment constraints. In addition to subjective information on access to finance as an obstacle, 
the questionnaire also collects objective information on aspects of financial access, allowing us to 
create several variables: Loan is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm has a loan or line of 
credit from a financial institution or an overdraft facility. Credit constraint is a dummy variable 
indicating whether an establishment did not apply for loans or lines of credit for one or more of the 
following reasons: application procedures for loans or lines of credit are complex, interest rates are 
not favorable, collateral requirements are too high, the size and maturity of loans are insufficient, 
getting bank loans requires making informal payments, or the establishment did not think its 
application would be approved.
4 Sales credit is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has 
positive purchase of its material inputs or services paid for after delivery (about 70 percent of firms 
                                                            
3 ln(1+X) is considered approximately equal to ln(X). We therefore use ln(1+X) to compute the log of the number of 
employees, since some firms have zero employees in a specific year but not in both years.  
4 No dummy variable is included for firms applying for new loans or lines of credit whose applications were rejected 
because this information is available for only 14 percent of firms in the sample. 8 
 
in the sample have sales credit). We also include a dummy variable indicating whether a firm has a 
positive share of investment financed with external funds (this applies to 24 percent of firms in the 
sample).  
The World Bank Enterprise Surveys also provide important information on firm characteristics, 
including size, age, sector,
5  export activity, and ownership as well as whether a firm is an 
independent, single establishment. The sample used in this paper is stratified by size, age, sector, 
region, and other firm characteristics. (Variable descriptions and distributions are reported in tables 
1, 2 and 3.) Firms are divided into four categories by size: micro (1–10 permanent employees), small 
(11–50), medium (51–200), and large (more than 200). The sample includes mostly micro firms (39 
percent of the total) and small firms (37 percent); only 16 percent are medium-size and 7 percent 
large. Firms are divided into three categories by age: young (1–5 years),
6 mature (6–15), and older (more 
than 15). Most are mature (47 percent) or older (41 percent); only 11 percent are young firms. 
Ownership is defined as being foreign or government if “10 percent or more” of the firm is foreign or 
government owned; 12 percent of the firms in the sample are foreign owned and only 2 percent are 
government owned. Exporter is a dummy variable indicating that direct exports account for  10 
percent or more of a firm’s sales; 13 percent of the sample firms are exporters.  
Whether a firm has a single establishment or multiple ones matters for firm growth, especially in the 
manufacturing sector (see Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson 1989). We therefore include a dummy 
variable indicating whether a firm is an independent, single establishment. Most of the firms in the 
sample are single establishments (85 percent), while 14 percent are part of multi-establishment 
entities. Finally, we divide the firms into three sectors: manufacturing (55 percent), sales (23 percent are 
in the retail and wholesale sector), and other services (20 percent). The sample includes firms from six 
regions: 31 percent from Sub-Saharan Africa, 28 percent from Latin America and the Caribbean, 27 
percent from Europe and Central Asia, 11 percent from East Asia and Pacific, and only 3 percent 
from the Middle East and North Africa and South Asia.
7  
Table 1 provides an overview of firm growth by firm characteristics and by region. Young, small 
firms experience rapid growth in their labor force. The mean growth rate for micro firms is twice 
that for small firms and three times that for medium-size firms. There appears to be little growth in 
employment for large firms on average. The mean growth rate for young firms is nearly twice that 
for mature firms and more than three times that for older firms. On average, there is little difference 
in growth rate between single, independent establishments and those that are part of multi-
establishment entities or between the manufacturing, sales, and services sectors. Firms in Africa and 
Latin America grow faster than those in Europe and Central Asia and East Asia and Pacific. 
4.  The Most Binding Constraint of the Business Environment 
                                                            
5 The questionnaire provides information on industry, and we use this information to establish the sector variable.  
6 Firms operating for less than one year are classified as young firms. 
7 Because of space limitations, abbreviations are sometimes used for the regions in tables: AFR for Sub-Saharan Africa, 
LAC for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECA for Europe and Central Asia, and EAP for East Asia and Pacific. 9 
 
Having the managers of firms rate constraints on the firms’ operation and growth is a useful start 
for identifying important obstacles in the business environment. We analyze these obstacles not only 
by using econometric tools but also by examining the importance of these obstacles across regions 
and sectors.  
4.1  Understanding Obstacles to Firms’ Operation 
In the World Bank Enterprise Survey, as noted, firms rate 15 obstacles in their business 
environment. These are access to finance, practices of competitors in the informal sector, electricity, 
corruption, crime, inadequately educated workforce, labor regulations, business licensing and 
permits, political instability, tax administration, tax rates, transport, customs and trade regulations, 
courts, and access to land.  
A review of firm responses shows that the biggest reported obstacles differ across regions and 
countries (see appendix). Using model 2 (as explained in greater detail in the next section), we find 
that different sectors also confront different obstacles. For example, in the manufacturing sector 
access to finance, informal sector competition, tax rates, and labor regulations matter the most, 
while in the sales and services sectors only access to finance and informal sector competition are 
negatively and significantly correlated with firm growth (see table 6). Estimation results for the same 
model show that each country faces its own set of significant obstacles.
8 So does each region (see 
table 5).  
Many of these obstacles are linked directly or indirectly to poor firm performance. In an ideal world 
a country would address all these problems in order to improve firm performance. But governments 
in developing countries have limited financial and human resources and, as argued by the growth 
diagnostics approach, should therefore prioritize reform efforts to remove the most important 
constraints.  
The top three obstacles to firms’ operation emerging from the survey data for our sample are 
electricity, access to finance, and tax rates (figure 1). But we do not know whether these are the top 
obstacles to employment growth. We therefore need to analyze which obstacles have a significant 
effect on employment growth. 
                                                            
8 The estimation results are available upon request. 10 
 
 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2006–10). 
 
4.2  Identifying the Most Binding Constraint on Firms’ Growth 
With figure 1 as a starting point, we set up an econometric model to investigate which of the 15 
constraints is the most binding. We define a constraint as the most binding if it is statistically 
significant, has a large coefficient in all estimations (models), and has the right sign—that is, has a 
negative effect on employment growth. We design three models: 
Model 1: 
EG = b0 + b1Individual Obstacle + b2Firm Characteristics + Country Fixed Effects + e1   (1) 
Model 2: 
EG = b0 + b1All 15 Obstacles + b2Firm Characteristics + Country Fixed Effects + e2   (2) 
Model 3:  
EG = b0 + b1Only Significant Obstacle (in Model 2) + b2Firm Characteristics  
+ Country Fixed Effects + e3             ( 3 )  
where EG refers to the employment growth of firm i at time t; Individual Obstacle is each obstacle 






















of permanent employees at the beginning of period t−3), labor size squared, age, age squared, and 
indicators of whether a firm is part of a multi-establishment entity (multi), is in manufacturing 
(manuf), is an exporter, is foreign owned (foreign), and is government owned (govt).  
The results suggest that access to finance and competition from the informal sector are the most 
binding constraints, with statistically significant effects in all models. Columns 1–15 in table 4, 
presenting the estimation results for model 1 for each obstacle, show that only access to finance and 
competition from the informal sector have a significant negative effect on employment growth. 
Column 16 shows the estimation results for model 2, run for all 15 obstacles together, and column 
17 presents the results for model 3, which includes all significant obstacles. Once again we find that 
access to finance and competition from the informal sector are the most binding constraints. We 
also examine the significance of the effect of these obstacles on firm growth across regions and 
sectors to check the robustness of the findings. Tables 5 and 6 confirm that access to finance and 
competition from the informal sector matter the most after controlling for firm characteristics.  
Our results demonstrate that both econometrically and economically access to finance and 
competition from the informal sector matter the most for firms’ employment growth—findings that 
are in line with the starting point of the rankings of reported obstacles shown in the appendix. While 
statistically both constraints are equally binding, the meaning of the second constraint is ambiguous. 
The survey asks firms whether they see competition from the informal sector as an obstacle. To any 
individual firm, competition poses a threat to survival. Yet at the level of the economy it is 
competition that drives firms to improve productivity and therefore drives growth. So it is not clear 
to us that competition from the informal sector should be considered an obstacle to firms’ 
operation. The finding that competition from the informal sector is the second most important 
binding constraint may indicate that the formal firms covered by the survey are not the appropriate 
firm organization form in developing countries.  Moreover, this survey question is not followed by 
other questions on related aspects of competition, allowing too little information to assess the 
importance of informal sector competition. Therefore we do not further address this issue in the 
paper.  
While perception-based indicators like those applied in the analysis discussed here are useful, 
quantitative indicators may give a more accurate picture of the business environment. Firm 
managers within a country may have different perceptions of the same obstacle, and firm managers 
in different countries and regions have different frames of reference. A problem perceived as a 
moderate obstacle by one firm may be perceived as a severe obstacle by another, even though the 
problem imposes a smaller cost on the second firm.   
In the next three sections we use objective measures to examine the importance of access to finance. 
As discussed, we cannot analyze informal sector competition because of its ambiguity and because 
the data do not provide sufficient information. We leave further analysis of this constraint with 
objective measures for future work, when the data are available. 12 
 
5.  Impact of Financial Access Variables on Employment Growth 
In this section we examine the effect of financial access variables on firm employment growth, 
controlling for individual firm characteristics. The model is set up with the following specification: 
EG = b0 + b1Laborsize + b2Age + b3Multi + b4Manuf + b5Exporter + b6Foreign + b7Govt + 
b8FC(s) + Country Fixed Effects + e       (4) 
where EG refers to the employment growth of firm i at time t (the growth in the number of 
permanent employees between t−3 and t) and FC denotes each of the financial access variables—
loan, credit constraint, sales credit, and external finance. 
Our specification accounts for heteroskedasticity and country fixed effects. All outliers have been 
removed. We also emphasize the importance of ownership structure by varying the type of 
establishment: single or multiple, foreign or government owned, exporter or nonexporter. The 
negative relationship between firm growth and firm size shown in table 7—along with the 
supportive evidence in table 1 showing that smaller firms grow faster than larger firms—suggests 
that Gibrat’s law does not hold in this sample of firms. This finding is true across regions and 
sectors. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on firm age tells us that there is an 
inverse relationship between firm growth and firm age, which is consistent with Jovanovic’s model 
(1982) of disproportionate growth.  
With other firm characteristics held constant, the rate of growth is significantly lower for 
independent, single-establishment firms and government-owned firms. Exporters and foreign-
owned firms tend to have greater employment growth. In Africa and East Asia firms in the 
manufacturing sector have higher employment growth than firms in the sales and services sectors.  
On average, a 1 percent increase in beginning-of-period firm size is associated with a 0.93 percent 
increase in end-of-period size (after three years) when the beginning-of-period age is held constant 
(based on the results in table 7, column 1). Based on the analysis across regions, we get estimated 
elasticities of end-of-period size with respect to beginning-of-period size of approximately 0.9 for 
Africa, East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean (table 
7, columns 6–9). With beginning-of-period size held constant, a 1 percent increase in beginning-of-
period firm age is associated with a 0.07 percent decrease in end-of-period size (table 7, column 1). 
The results in table 7 show that financial access variables have a significant effect on firm growth. 
Columns 1–4 indicate that with other factors held constant, having a loan or overdraft facility 
increases the growth in a firm’s number of permanent employees by 3.1 percent; being credit 
constrained reduces a firm’s employment growth by 1.9 percent; having sales credit increases firm’s 
growth by 2.6 percent; and having external investment funds increases growth by 4.2 percent. If we 
include all these significant financial access variables in one model after controlling for firm 
characteristics, they still have significant effects on employment growth, though the effects are of 
smaller magnitude. And if we use the same model and run the regressions in different regions, the 13 
 
significance and signs of the effects remain the same across regions. These strong results show that 
access to finance does indeed matter for firm growth. 
6.  Determinants of Financial Access  
In this section we estimate the probability of a firm having access to finance based on its 
characteristics. We use the following model: 
FC =  b0 + b1Small + b2Medium + b3Large + b4Mature + b5Older + b6Multi + b7Manuf + 
b8Exporter + b9Foreign + b10Govt + e         ( 5 )  
where FC denotes each of the financial access variables—loan, credit constraint, sales credit, and 
external finance. 
We estimate this model by probit. We focus on firms of different sizes (micro, small, medium-size, 
and large, with micro as the base category that is omitted from the regression) and different ages 
(young, mature, and older, with young as the base category that is omitted from the regression). The 
results show that a firm’s size, age, and status as an exporter are strong determinants of its access to 
finance (table 8). 
There is a bigger difference in access to finance between micro and large firms than between small 
and large firms. With the analysis controlling for firm characteristics and using country fixed effects, 
micro firms are more likely to be credit constrained. With other factors held constant, large firms are 
85 percent less likely to be credit constrained than micro firms. In addition, large firms are 97 
percent more likely to have a loan or overdraft facility and 75 percent more likely to have a share of 
investment financed externally than micro firms. Medium-size and large firms are about 32 and 43 
percent more likely to have sales credit than micro firms, while small firms are about 19 percent 
more likely to offer sales credit than micro firms.  
Older firms are 29 percent more likely to have a loan, 8 percent more likely to have sales credit, and 
20 percent less likely to be credit constrained than young firms. Mature firms are only 6 percent less 
likely to be credit constrained and about 10 percent more likely to have a loan than young firms, 
with other factors held constant.  
Other interesting results also emerge. Firms in the manufacturing sector are 20 percent more likely 
to be credit constrained. With other factors held constant, firms that are exporters are 41 percent 
more likely to have a loan, 26 percent less likely to be credit constrained, and 20 percent more likely 
to have external finance for investment than non-exporters. 14 
 
7.  Effect of Financial Access on Employment Growth by Firm Size and Age 
In this section we investigate the effect of financial access on employment growth by firm size and 
firm age first for each of the financial access variables individually and then for all the variables 
combined. 
7.1   Effect of Individual Financial Access Variables 
To examine the effect of the financial access variables individually, we use the following model: 
EG = b0 + b1FC + b2Small*FC + b3Medium*FC + b4Large*FC + b5Mature*FC + b6Older*FC + 
b7Multi + b8Manuf + b9Exporter + b10Foreign + b11Govt + Country Fixed Effects + e     (6) 
where EG refers to the employment growth of firm i at time t (the growth in the number of 
permanent employees between t−3 and t) and FC denotes each of the financial access variables—
loan, credit constraint, sales credit, and external finance. 
Table 9 shows the effect of each of the financial access variables—loan, credit constraint, sales 
credit, and external finance—in turn on employment growth. Micro firms are again the base 
category that is omitted from the regression. 
Among size categories, micro firms appear to benefit the most from having access to finance. 
Column 1 shows that having a loan increases employment growth by 9 percent in micro firms, but 
by only 4 percent in medium-size firms and 2 percent in large firms, with other factors held 
constant. The results in columns 3 and 4 tell the same story. Micro and small firms gain the most 
from finance in forms ranging from simple to more sophisticated—from having a loan or overdraft 
facility to sales credit to external finance for investment. Column 2 supports the argument that 
micro and small firms benefit the most from having access to finance. Being credit constrained will 
make larger firms suffer more than smaller firms.  
Young firms expand more than older firms with access to the same forms of finance. Having a loan 
or overdraft facility increases employment growth by 9 percent for young firms, but by 6 percent for 
mature firms and 3 percent for older firms, with other factors held constant. Similarly, having sales 
credit or external finance increases growth more for young firms than for mature and older firms. 
Being credit constrained reduces firm growth as firms age. This finding emphasizes the importance 
of firm age to firm growth. The effect of being credit constrained also varies by sector, appearing to 
be stronger in manufacturing than in the sales or services sector.  
We also look at the effect of financial access on employment growth across regions. The estimation 
results by region are presented in table 10 for each financial access variable at a time. The finding 
that having a loan, sales credit, or a share of investment financed externally helps micro firms the 
most still holds. Indeed, this finding holds for all regions. The finding that young firms expand more 
than older firms with access to the same forms of finance also holds across regions. 
 15 
 
7.2   Effect of Combined Financial Access Variables 
In this section we look at the effect of all four financial access variables combined on employment 
growth, by firm size, age, sector, and region. We use the following model:  
EG = b0 + b1Small + b2Medium + b3Large + b4Mature + b5Older + b6Multi + b7Manuf + 
b8Exporter + b9Foreign + b10Govt + b11Loan + b12Credit Constraint + b13Sales Credit + b14 
External Finance + Country Fixed Effects + e     (7) 
where EG refers to the employment growth of firm i at time t (the growth in the number of 
permanent employees between t−3 and t). 
Table 11 shows the estimation results for equation 7. The effects of all the financial access variables 
are statistically significant and have the right signs. The results in column 1 indicate that firm growth 
slows both as a firm expands its labor force and as it ages, controlling for other firm characteristics. 
Columns 2–5 suggest that having a loan and having external finance are important for firms of all 
sizes, though the effects are largest for small firms. The effects for medium-size and large firms are 
similar in size. The effect of being credit constrained increases with firm size.  
Columns 6–8 show that having a loan is very important for firms of all ages, with the largest effect 
on young firms. Being credit constrained has the largest effect on medium-size firms followed by 
large firms. The effects of having external finance are statistically significant for firms of all ages. In 
other words, trust and external finance matter to firms, regardless of their age.  
Columns 9–11 show that most forms of financial access are important to firms, no matter their 
sector. Having a loan has the largest effect on employment growth for firms in the manufacturing 
sector. Being credit constrained has a negative effect on firms in all sectors, with the largest effect in 
the manufacturing and sales sectors. Having external finance matters in all sectors, and the effects 
are of similar magnitude. 
Columns 12–15 present the estimation results across regions. Having a loan and external finance 
matters to firms in different regions, with the largest effects in Latin America. Being credit 
constrained has a significant effect on firm employment growth only in Europe and Central Asia 
and Latin America. From these results, together with the results in tables 7–10, we find that the 
interaction between financial access variables and firms’ size or age is significant in explaining firms’ 
employment growth. 
8.  Firm Size Distribution 
Because a firm’s size plays a significant part in determining its employment growth, we further assess 
the relationship between firm size and financial constraints. The survey data allow the creation of a 
variable showing which firms are credit constrained, which we identify as those that applied for a 16 
 
loan and were rejected or that were discouraged from applying for a loan.
9 The data also include 
extensive information on the sources of firms’ investments in fixed assets. These sources can be 
external (formal or informal) or internal.
10 
Confirming the findings of Cabral and Mata (2003), figure 2 shows that the firm size distribution is 
skewed to the right and that the skewness tends to diminish with age. The size distribution of older 
firms is more symmetric than that of young firms.  
As shown in figure 3, the firm size distribution is skewed more to the right in the manufacturing and 
services sectors, where micro and small firms make up about two-thirds of the sample. Figure 4 
suggests that Africa has the largest share of micro and small firms while other regions have more 
medium-size and large firms. This again provides evidence of the “missing middle” in Africa. 
Using the indicator of credit constrained created for this analysis, we split the sample into two 
groups, credit-constrained and non-credit-constrained firms. As figure 5 shows, the firm size 
distribution is skewed to the right for credit-constrained firms. This result is in line with the finding 
that being credit constrained has a negative effect on firm growth—and, especially, that this effect is 
largest for small firms. Taking this analysis further, we investigate the firm size distribution using the 
survey data on firms’ perceptions of access to finance, splitting the sample between those perceiving 
it as a major or very severe obstacle and those viewing it as a minor obstacle or no obstacle. Figure 6 
shows that the size distribution of firms perceiving access to finance as a major or very severe 
obstacle is skewed to the right. This result is confirmed by the data for our sample showing that 
most of the firms regarding access to finance as a major or very severe obstacle are micro or small. 
The size distribution for firms perceiving access to finance as a minor obstacle or no obstacle is 
more symmetric.  
The findings in this and previous sections suggest that a low level of financial development results in 
a skewed firm size distribution, with a larger relative share of small firms. Policies favoring the 
development of the financial sector should therefore have an effect on the firm size distribution and, 
ultimately, favor the adoption of different technologies and an improved allocation of resources if 
the industry in question is in line with the country’s comparative advantages (Lin, 2010). 
9.  Conclusion 
Using a newly available data set from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2006–10) for 39,538 firms 
across 98 countries, we investigate the binding constraints on firms’ employment growth. With an 
econometric model and subjective measures, we find that access to finance and informal sector 
competition are the most binding constraints—both globally and in each region. Using objective 
                                                            
9 Our measure of credit-constrained firms comprises those that applied for a loan and were rejected and those that did 
not apply for one or more of the following reasons: fear of rejection, collateral requirements too high, interest rates not 
favorable, or a belief that the application would not be approved. 
10 Formal sources are private or public banks, nonbank financial institutions, issues of new debt, and suppliers’ credit. 
Informal sources are friends and moneylenders. Internal sources consist of issuances of new shares and own funds. 17 
 
measures and controlling for firm characteristics, we evaluate the importance of access to finance for 
firms’ employment growth. We find that access to different forms of finance matters. These results 
from our cross-country firm-level analysis suggest that governments seeking to improve the business 
environment and promote firm growth should make financial sector reforms a priority.  
Objective business conditions vary systematically across firms of different sizes and ages, and good 
business conditions favor smaller firms, especially micro firms. Micro and small firms gain the most 
from access to finance in forms ranging from simple to more sophisticated—from a loan or 
overdraft facility to sales credit to external finance for investment. This finding holds not only 
globally but also for different regions. While sales credit is important only for micro and small firms, 
having a loan or overdraft facility and receiving external finance for investment promote 
employment growth for firms of all sizes across regions. And sales credit and external finance matter 
for firms of all ages.  
The firm size distribution is skewed toward smaller firms. The skewness declines with firm age—and 
is more present in Africa, among firms that are credit constrained, and among those that perceive 
access to finance as a serious obstacle. These findings call for policies favoring the development of 
the financial sector, which can help small firms grow into medium-size and large firms. 
The findings have several implications for developing countries. First, because the constraints faced 
by firms differ across countries and, within countries, across sectors, policies to promote firm 
growth need to be tailored to each country and sector. Second, finance appears to be the most 
binding constraint across sectors and countries, suggesting that reforms in this sector could yield 
broad benefits—including by helping to address the problem of the “missing middle” in developing 
countries. Third, while access to finance is a binding constraint on firms’ growth in all developing 
countries, the fact that industrial development in some countries took off faster and sooner than 
others indicate that there are other constraints that are not captured by the Enterprise Survey.   
Finally, reforms in finance take time, and a quicker development strategy could be to identify the 
binding constraints in a specific subsector and try to address them through direct policy measures.  
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Variable Description Mean SD
Employment growth Employment growth [(lnS it - lnS i,t-3)/3] 0.052 0.127
Laborsize Number of permanent employees [lnS i,t-3]3 . 1 1 2 1 . 3 5 0
Age Years of firm's operation 2.602 0.741
Multi Equal to 1 if firm is independent, single establishment; 0 otherwise 0.138 0.345
Manuf Equal to 1 if firm is in manufacturing or construction sector; 0 otherwise 0.555 0.497
Exporter Equal to 1 if direct exports account for more than 10 percent of firm's sales; 0 otherwise? 0.130 0.336
Foreign Equal to 1 if firm has 10 percent or more of foreign ownership; 0 otherwise 0.117 0.321
Govt Equal to 1 if firm has 10 percent or more of government ownership; 0 otherwise 0.017 0.129
Loan Equal to 1 if firm has loan, line of credit, or overdraft facility; 0 otherwise 0.573 0.495
Credit constraint Equal to 1 if firm did not apply for loan for some reason; 0 otherwise 0.334 0.472
Sales credit Equal to 1 if firm has positive sales paid for after delivery; 0 otherwise 0.702 0.458
External finance Equal to 1 if firm has a positive amount of external funds; 0 otherwise 0.237 0.425
Access to finance How much of an obstacle to firm's operation is access to finance? 1.725 1.564
Informal competition How much of an obstacle to firm's operation are informal sector competitors? 1.627 1.453
Labor regulations How much of an obstacle to firm's operation are labor regulations? 0.958 1.181
Inadequate education How much of an obstacle to firm's operation is an inadequately educated workforce? 1.408 1.353
Electricity How much of an obstacle to firm's operation is electricity? 1.843 1.526
Transport How much of an obstacle to firm's operation is transport of goods, supplies, and inputs? 1.224 1.310
Customs and trade How much of an obstacle to firm's operation are customs and trade regulations? 0.954 1.242
Access to land How much of an obstacle to firm's operation is access to land? 1.031 1.334
Courts How much of an obstacle to firm's operation are courts? 1.025 1.280
Crime How much of an obstacle to firm's operation are crime, theft, and disorder? 1.423 1.382
Tax rates How much of an obstacle to firm's operation are tax rates? 1.828 1.374
Tax administration How much of an obstacle to firm's operation is tax administration? 1.439 1.319
Licensing and permits How much of an obstacle to firm's operation are business licensing and permits? 1.095 1.238
Political instability How much of an obstacle to firm's operation is political instability? 1.615 1.504
Corruption How much of an obstacle to firm's operation is corruption? 1.780 1.530
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2006-10).









Characteristic Frequency Percent Cumulative percent
By size
   Micro 15,357 38.84 38.84
   Small 14,791 37.41 76.25
   Medium 6,499 16.44 92.69
   Large 2,845 7.2 99.88
   Unknown 46 0.12 100
By age
   Young 4,440 11.23 11.23
   Mature 18,551 46.92 58.15
   Older 16,146 40.84 98.99
   Unknown 401 1.01 100
By establishment number
   Multi-establishment 5,397 13.65 13.65
   Single establishment 33,729 85.31 98.96
   Unknown 412 1.04 100
By sector
   Manufacturing 21,783 55.09 55.09
   Sales 8,901 22.51 77.6
   Services 7,845 19.84 97.44
   Unknown 1,009 2.55 100
By trade orientation
   Nonexporter 34,405 87.02 87.02
   Exporter 5,133 12.98 100
By foreign ownership
   Domestically owned  34,587 87.48 87.48
   Foreign owned 4,579 11.58 99.06
   Unknown 372 0.94 100
By government ownership
   Government owned 37,858 95.75 95.75
   Privately owned 649 1.64 97.39
   Unknown 1,031 2.61 100
Total establishments 39,538
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2006-10).





Characteristic or region Mean Min Max
By size (number of employees)
   Micro (1-10) 0.086 -0.536 0.866
   Small (11-50) 0.035 -0.732 0.844
   Medium (51-200) 0.025 -0.638 0.594
   Large (201+) 0.007 -0.562 0.753
   Unknown 0.606 0.231 0.880
By age (years of operation)
   Young (1-5) 0.100 -0.732 0.880
   Mature (6-15) 0.061 -0.623 0.807
   Older (16+) 0.029 -0.584 0.866
   Unknown 0.022 -0.458 0.448
By establishment number
   Multi-establishment 0.051 -0.732 0.880
   Single establishment 0.055 -0.452 0.866
By sector
   Manufacturing 0.049 -0.638 0.880
   Sales 0.057 -0.525 0.855
   Services 0.054 -0.732 0.799
By region
   Sub-Saharan Africa 0.066 -0.732 0.813
   East Asia & Pacific 0.025 -0.638 0.880
   Europe & Central Asia 0.043 -0.547 0.799
   Latin America & Caribbean 0.056 -0.510 0.697
   Middle East & North Africa 0.043 -0.384 0.462
   South Asia 0.076 -0.623 0.866
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2006-10).
Table 3. Employment Growth by Firm Characteristic and by 
Region24 
 
V a r i a b l e 123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7
Access to finance -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Informal sector competition -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)




Customs and trade 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
Access to land 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)






Tax rates    -0.001* -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001)
Tax administration -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Licensing and permits    0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)




Labor regulations 0.002*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Adjusted R-squared 0.123 0.122 0.124 0.121 0.125 0.122 0.121 0.117 0.121 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.121 0.121 0.130 0.127
Number of observations 35,837 35,466 36,216 36,554 32,967 35,399 35,814 32,794 36,278 36,287 36,154 35,350 35,435 36,222 36,297 26,574 34,359
Number of countries 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 95 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 95 96
Note:  Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on countries. Model 1 (col. 1-15): EG = b 0 + b 1Individual Obstacle + b 2Firm Characteristics + Country Fixed Effects + e1. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Source: Authors' estimations based on data from World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2006-10).
Model 2 (col. 16): EG = b 0 + b 1All 15 Obstacles + b 2Firm Characteristics + Country Fixed Effects + e2. The hypothesis that the coefficients for access to finance and informal sector competition differ 
is tested and rejected.
Dependent variable: employment growth
Table 4. Effect of Business Environment Obstacles on Employment Growth25 
 
 
World AFR EAP ECA LAC
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Laborsize -0.022*** -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.018*** -0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Age -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.031*** -0.024***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Multi 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.010 0.020*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004)
Manuf 0.003 0.012*** 0.012** -0.009** 0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Exporter 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.018** 0.020*** 0.025***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Foreign 0.011*** 0.008** 0.009 0.021*** 0.011**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Govt -0.017*** -0.013 0.017 -0.022*** -0.020
(0.005) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.017)
Access to finance -0.004*** -0.002* -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Informal sector competition -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.008*** -0.002* -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Inadequate education 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Electricity 0.001* -0.001 0.004** 0.001 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Customs and trade 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.006** 0.006*** 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Access to land 0.003*** -0.000 0.004* 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Political instability -0.002** -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Courts -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.004** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Crime 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Tax rates -0.001* -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Tax administration -0.000 0.002* -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Licensing and permits 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Corruption -0.001* -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Transport 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Labor regulations -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.176*** 0.182*** 0.156*** 0.184*** 0.174***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
Adjusted R-squared 0.130 0.129 0.148 0.130 0.112
Number of observations 26,574 8,600 3,079 6,596 7,592
Number of countries 95 37 10 30 15
Model: EG = b 0 + b 1All 15 Obstacles + b 2Firm Characteristics + Region + Country Fixed Effects + e.
Source: Authors' estimations based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2006-10).
Dependent variable: employment growth
Table 5. Effect of Business Environment Obstacles on Employment Growth by Region
Note:  Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on countries. Regressions for 
the Middle East and North Africa and South Asia are excluded because of insufficient data.
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.26 
 
Table 6. Effect of Business Environment Obstacles on Employment Growth by Sector
Manufacturing Sales Services
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Laborsize -0.026*** -0.014*** -0.021***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Age -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.018***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Multi 0.022*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Exporter 0.026*** 0.017** 0.010
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Foreign 0.011*** 0.009* 0.012**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Govt -0.009 -0.036** -0.020*
(0.007) (0.015) (0.011)
Access to finance -0.004*** -0.002* -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Informal sector competition -0.004*** -0.002* -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Inadequate education 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Electricity 0.002*** 0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Customs and trade 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Access to land 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Political instability -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Courts -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Crime 0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Tax rates -0.002** 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Tax administration 0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Licensing and permits 0.000 0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Corruption -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Transport 0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Labor regulations -0.002* -0.003 0.004**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.191*** 0.151*** 0.167***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009)
Adjusted R-squared 0.146 0.118 0.114
Number of observations 15,322 6,014 5,237
Number of countries 95 95 95
Note:  Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on countries.  
Model: EG = b 0 + b 1All 15 Obstacles + b 2Firm Characteristics + Region + Country Fixed Effects + e. * 
Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors' estimations based on data from World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2006-10).
Dependent variable: employment growth27 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variable World World World World World AFR EAP ECA LAC
Laborsize -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.022*** -0.023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Age -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.030*** -0.023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Multi 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Manuf 0.0003 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.010*** 0.010** -0.010*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Exporter 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.015*** 0.028***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Foreign 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.008** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Govt -0.009** -0.011** -0.011** -0.010** -0.008* -0.008 0.024** -0.015** -0.016
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.020)
Loan 0.031*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.026***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Credit constraint -0.019*** -0.010*** -0.004* 0.001 -0.024*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Sales credit 0.026*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.006 0.012*** 0.005
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
External finance 0.042*** 0.036*** 0.021*** 0.041*** 0.036*** 0.041***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.163*** 0.182*** 0.166*** 0.162*** 0.174*** 0.144*** 0.165*** 0.153***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Number of observations 34,894 35,641 36,722 36,722 34,524 10,270 3,971 9,423 9,911
Adjusted R-squared 0.131 0.125 0.123 0.138 0.146 0.144 0.155 0.154 0.128
Source: Authors' estimations based on data from World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2006-10).
Table 7. Effect of Objective Financial Access Variables on Employment Growth
Note:  Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on countries. Regressions for the Middle 
East and North Africa and South Asia are excluded because of insufficient data.
Model: EG = b 0 + b 1Laborsize + b 2Age + b3Multi + b 4Manuf + b 5Exporter + b 6Foreign + b 7Govt + b 8FC(s) + Country 
Fixed Effects + e.   ; * Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent 













(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Loan Credit constraint Sales credit External finance
Small 0.467*** -0.412*** 0.187*** 0.338***
(0.041) (0.043) (0.035) (0.030)
Medium 0.779*** -0.721*** 0.320*** 0.572***
(0.063) (0.068) (0.049) (0.038)
Large 0.973*** -0.852*** 0.427*** 0.747***
(0.072) (0.073) (0.078) (0.045)
Mature 0.097** -0.063* 0.055 0.023
(0.040) (0.035) (0.055) (0.037)
Older 0.287*** -0.200*** 0.079 0.034
(0.066) (0.057) (0.063) (0.048)
Multi 0.032 -0.128*** 0.023 0.007
(0.051) (0.036) (0.047) (0.048)
Manuf -0.089 0.196*** -0.031 -0.015
(0.062) (0.048) (0.058) (0.048)
Exporter 0.412*** -0.261*** 0.084* 0.204***
(0.064) (0.053) (0.049) (0.044)
Foreign -0.101 -0.024 -0.026 -0.157***
(0.070) (0.049) (0.050) (0.043)
Govt -0.361*** 0.199** 0.042 -0.118
(0.119) (0.082) (0.099) (0.094)
Constant -0.325*** -0.071 0.070 -1.039***
(0.104) (0.091) (0.063) (0.070)
Number of observations 34,916 35,663 36,746 36,746
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors' estimations based on data from World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2006-10).
Table 8. Objective Financial Access Variables by Firm Characteristic
Note:  Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on countries.
Model: FC = b 0 + b 1Small + b 2Medium + b 3Large + b 4Mature + b 5Older + b 6Multi + b 7Manuf + b 8Exporter + 




Table 9. Differences in Effects of Objective Financial Access Variables on Employment Growth 
 by Firm Size and Age 
   Dependent variable: employment growth 




constraint  Sales credit  External finance 
Financial access variable 
(FC)  0.091***  0.053***  0.106***  0.105*** 
   (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.012)  (0.006) 
Small*FC  -0.040***  -0.057***  -0.043***  -0.039*** 
   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.004) 
Medium*FC  -0.051***  -0.065***  -0.057***  -0.056*** 
   (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.004) 
Large*FC  -0.069***  -0.078***  -0.066***  -0.073*** 
   (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.005) 
Mature*FC  -0.035***  -0.026***  -0.042***  -0.030*** 
   (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.012)  (0.006) 
Older*FC  -0.061***  -0.044***  -0.062***  -0.051*** 
   (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.012)  (0.006) 
Multi  0.008***  0.006***  0.003  0.004** 
   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Manuf  -0.005***  -0.006***  -0.009***  -0.009*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Exporter  0.009***  0.003  0.001  0.004* 
   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Foreign  0.003  0.003  0.000  0.001 
   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Govt  -0.035***  -0.041***  -0.046***  -0.042*** 
   (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Constant  0.045***  0.055***  0.055***  0.048*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.090  0.065  0.095  0.078 
Number of observations  34,894  35,641  36,722  36,722 
Number of countries  95  96  96  96 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on countries. 
Model: EG = b0 + b1FC + b2Small*FC + b3Medium*FC + b4Large*FC + b5Mature*FC + b6Older*FC + 
b7Multi + b8Manuf + b9Exporter + b10Foreign + b11Govt + Country Fixed Effects + e. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent 
level. 
Source: Authors' estimations based on data from World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2006-10). 
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AFR EAP ECA LAC AFR EAP ECA LAC AFR EAP ECA LAC AFR EAP ECA LAC
Financial access (FC) 0.063*** 0.061*** 0.108*** 0.123*** 0.044*** 0.090*** 0.044*** 0.071*** 0.056*** 0.077*** 0.109*** 0.140*** 0.070*** 0.089*** 0.108*** 0.136***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.018) (0.034) (0.020) (0.021) (0.010) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011)
Small*FC -0.026*** -0.033*** -0.035*** -0.054*** -0.049*** -0.076*** -0.043*** -0.066*** -0.019*** -0.051*** -0.031*** -0.069*** -0.027*** -0.018 -0.033*** -0.057***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.031) (0.013) (0.012) (0.007) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006)
Medium*FC -0.036*** -0.045*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.049*** -0.082*** -0.067*** -0.064*** -0.026*** -0.057*** -0.051*** -0.086*** -0.035*** -0.039*** -0.058*** -0.071***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.037) (0.014) (0.015) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007)
Large*FC -0.047*** -0.069*** -0.084*** -0.069*** -0.051** -0.111*** -0.070*** -0.065*** -0.079*** -0.024*** -0.067*** -0.087*** -0.057*** -0.061*** -0.080*** -0.083***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.021) (0.014) (0.011) (0.016) (0.023) (0.046) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008)
Mature*FC -0.039*** -0.018 -0.035*** -0.043*** -0.018*** -0.040*** -0.037*** -0.035** -0.033*** 0.012** -0.043*** -0.049*** -0.037*** -0.025 -0.024** -0.038***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.020) (0.033) (0.019) (0.022) (0.010) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011)
Older*FC -0.062*** -0.037*** -0.059*** -0.076*** -0.037*** -0.052*** -0.058*** -0.063*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.069*** -0.073*** -0.048*** -0.055*** -0.049*** -0.063***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.021) (0.031) (0.020) (0.022) (0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011)
Multi 0.001 0.001 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.002 -0.001 0.008* 0.006 -0.003 -0.006 0.008*** 0.006*** -0.001 -0.005 0.010** 0.007*
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Manuf 0.00002 0.001 -0.014*** -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.015*** -0.006** -0.003 -0.004 -0.017*** -0.007 -0.003 -0.004 -0.017*** -0.006**
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Exporter 0.004 -0.007 0.011*** 0.020*** -0.002 -0.008 0.003 0.012*** -0.005* -0.014 0.004*** 0.012*** -0.003 -0.011* 0.006 0.014***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Foreign -0.003 0.003 0.017*** 0.004 -0.003 0.006 0.012** 0.004 -0.008 0.002 0.011*** 0.004 -0.007** 0.002 0.013*** 0.006
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Govt -0.036*** -0.008 -0.041*** -0.031 -0.041*** -0.017 -0.048*** -0.036* -0.048*** -0.026 -0.051*** -0.036* -0.044*** -0.019* -0.047*** -0.032
(0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.020) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.021) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.020) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.020)
Constant 0.068*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.063*** 0.025*** 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.070*** 0.030*** 0.049*** 0.053*** 0.068*** 0.026*** 0.038*** 0.042***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Adjusted R-squared 0.069 0.060 0.099 0.097 0.062 0.062 0.070 0.045 0.083 0.086 0.090 0.092 0.055 0.056 0.082 0.079
Number of observations 10,358 4,100 9,527 9,949 10,636 4,076 9,907 10,067 10,878 4,431 10,237 10,203 10,878 4,431 10,237 10,203
Number of countries 37 10 30 15 38 10 30 15 38 10 30 15 38 10 30 15
Note:  Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on countries. Regressions for the Middle East and North Africa and South Asia are excluded because of insufficient data.
Model: EG = b 0 + b 1FC + b 2Small*FC + b 3Medium*FC + b 4Large*FC + b 5Mature*FC + b 6Older*FC + b 7Multi + b 8Manuf + b 9Exporter + b 10Foreign + b 11Govt + Region + Country Fixed Effects + e.
* Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Source:  Authors' estimations based on data from World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2006-10).
Table 10. Differences in Effects of Objective Financial Access Variables on Employment Growth by Firm Size and Age across Regions
Credit constraint Loan Sales credit External finance
Dependent variable: employment growth31 
 
Micro Small Medium Large Young Mature Older
Manufactu
ring
Sales Services AFR EAP ECA LAC
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Small -0.052*** -0.082*** -0.051*** -0.044*** -0.060*** -0.037*** -0.056*** -0.046*** -0.058*** -0.042*** -0.061***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Medium -0.067*** -0.113*** -0.071*** -0.054*** -0.080*** -0.041*** -0.065*** -0.056*** -0.080*** -0.065*** -0.067***
(0.002) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Large -0.091*** -0.137*** -0.089*** -0.080*** -0.110*** -0.032*** -0.082*** -0.078*** -0.107*** -0.093*** -0.085***
(0.003) (0.019) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
Mature -0.030*** -0.036*** -0.016*** -0.014 -0.017 -0.038*** -0.025*** -0.019*** -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.041*** -0.037***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.018) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Older -0.053*** -0.064*** -0.038*** -0.032*** -0.043** -0.060*** -0.047*** -0.040*** -0.046*** -0.036*** -0.065*** -0.065***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.018) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Multi 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.010* 0.009 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.009 0.018*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Manuf -0.001 0.011*** -0.002 -0.018*** -0.032*** 0.022*** -0.001 -0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009* -0.011*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Exporter 0.014*** 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.009** -0.001 0.035*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.017** 0.007 0.011** 0.009 0.013*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Foreign 0.009*** 0.006 0.013*** 0.008* 0.009 0.019** 0.014*** 0.001 0.010*** 0.008* 0.011** 0.002 0.012** 0.020*** 0.010**
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Govt -0.023*** -0.031* -0.007 -0.020*** -0.028*** -0.030* -0.019** -0.022*** -0.015** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.024** 0.002 -0.028*** -0.024
(0.005) (0.018) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.017) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.022)
Loan 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.023*** 0.017*** 0.015** 0.027*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.026***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Credit constraint -0.009*** -0.003 -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.018** -0.005 -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.007* -0.002 0.003 -0.023*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Sales credit -0.004 0.001 -0.008 -0.013** 0.004 0.011 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 0.006 -0.006 -0.003
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005)
External finance 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.042*** 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.019*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.041***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.041** 0.102*** 0.077*** 0.048*** 0.112*** 0.087*** 0.091*** 0.107*** 0.073*** 0.109*** 0.112***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.010) (0.019) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Adjusted R-squared 0.135 0.107 0.100 0.097 0.105 0.130 0.115 0.100 0.151 0.116 0.130 0.119 0.122 0.143 0.135
Number of observations 34,524 13,169 13,060 5,739 2,527 3,734 16,387 14,403 21,675 7,978 4,870 10,270 3,971 9,423 9,911
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 9 59 59 59 48 99 59 59 59 59 59 53 71 03 01 5
Note:  Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on countries. Regressions for the Middle East and North Africa and South Asia are excluded because of insufficient data.
Table 11. Effect of Combined Objective Financial Access Variables on Employment Growth by Firm Characteristic and by Region
Model: EG = b 0 + b 1Small + b 2Medium + b 3Large + b 4Mature + b 5Older + b 6Multi + b 7Manuf + b 8Exporter + b 9Foreign + b 10Govt + b 11Loan + b 12Credit Constraint + b 13Sales Credit + b 14 External 
Finance+ Country Fixed Effects + e
Source:  Authors' estimations based on data from World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2006-10).
By age By sector By region By size
World
Dependent variable: employment growth
























































































































































AFRICA                   
Angola, 2006  36.8  Electricity  12.5  Corruption  11.6  Access to Finance 
Benin, 2009  18.2  Access to Finance  15.0  Electricity  14.6  Practices Informal Sector 
Botswana, 2006  24.6  Access to Finance  11.8  Practices Informal Sector  11.0  Crime, Theft & Disorder 
Burkina Faso, 2009  35.5  Access to Finance  17.7  Tax Rates  10.8  Practices Informal Sector 
Burundi, 2006  41.3  Electricity  16.0  Access to Finance  14.3  Political instability 
Cameroon, 2009  24.9  Practices Informal Sector  19.4  Tax Administration  16.6  Access to Finance 
Cape Verde, 2009  17.1  Practices Informal Sector  13.1  Access to Finance  11.0  Electricity 
Chad, 2009  29.5  Political instability  23.8  Electricity  13.5  Corruption 
Congo, Rep., 2009  31.9  Electricity  15.6  Access to Finance  15.5  Political instability 
Côte d'Ivoire, 2009  45.2  Access to Finance  28.0  Political instability  7.5  Corruption 
Congo, Dem. Rep., 2006  46.5  Electricity  14.9  Access to Finance  9.6  Tax Rates 
Eritrea, 2009  28.7  Licenses & Permits  24.1  Political instability  17.0  Access to Land 
Gabon, 2009  23.4  Electricity  14.6  Transportation  10.3  Corruption 
Gambia, The, 2006  54.5  Electricity  11.7  Access to Finance  6.5  Tax Rates 
Ghana, 2007  48.8  Electricity  33.1  Access to Finance  6.3  Tax Rates 
Guinea, 2006  64.3  Electricity  10.3  Transportation  8.3  Access to Finance 
Guinea‐Bissau, 2006  47.1  Electricity  20.1  Access to Finance  7.7  Political instability 
Kenya, 2007  21.7  Tax Rates  13.5  Access to Finance  12.0  Practices Informal Sector 
Lesotho, 2009  15.9  Access to Finance  14.7  Corruption  11.2  Tax Rates 
Liberia, 2009  39.8  Access to Finance  17.4  Crime, Theft & Disorder  13.3  Electricity 
Madagascar, 2009  18.6  Electricity  15.4  Practices Informal Sector  13.9  Crime, Theft & Disorder 
Malawi, 2009  45.7  Access to Finance  11.4  Transportation  8.9  Practices Informal Sector 
Mali, 2007  28.9  Electricity  23.5  Access to Finance  15.1  Tax Rates 
Mauritania, 2006  21.6  Access to Finance  14.4  Practices Informal Sector  13.8  Electricity 
Mauritius, 2009  30.2  Access to Finance  18.0  Practices Informal Sector  11.3  Electricity 
Mozambique, 2007  23.2  Access to Finance  21.4  Practices Informal Sector  9.1  Electricity 
Namibia, 2006  21.7  Crime, Theft & Disorder  17.6  Tax Rates  12.1  Access to Finance 38 
 
Niger, 2009  21.2  Practices Informal Sector  20.3  Access to Finance  15.6  Political instability 
Nigeria, 2007  63.6  Electricity  15.5  Access to Finance  7.5  Transportation 
Rwanda, 2006  32.9  Electricity  27.4  Tax Rates  13.6  Access to Finance 
Senegal, 2007  41.2  Electricity  12.2  Access to Finance  11.0  Access to Land 
Sierra Leone, 2009  17.1  Tax Rates  14.8  Access to Finance  14.3  Electricity 
South Africa, 2007  40.4  Crime, Theft & Disorder  14.7  Electricity  7.5  Access to Finance 
Swaziland, 2006  25.4  Practices Informal Sector  18.5  Crime, Theft & Disorder  15.4  Tax Rates 
Tanzania, 2006  73.4  Electricity  9.8  Access to Finance  4.0  Tax Rates 
Togo, 2009  23.7  Access to Finance  23.3  Political instability  11.2  Practices Informal Sector 
Uganda, 2006  63.6  Electricity  11.3  Tax Rates  8.5  Practices Informal Sector 
Zambia, 2007  18.6  Tax Rates  15.3  Practices Informal Sector  14.3  Access to Finance 
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC                   
Fiji, 2009  44.4  Political instability  8.8  Labor regulations  8.6  Crime, Theft & Disorder 
Indonesia, 2009  47.9  Access to Finance  13.7  Practices Informal Sector  6.9  Political instability 






15.8  Electricity  12.6  Transportation 
Mongolia, 2009  30.3  Access to Finance  16.0  Tax Rates  10.2 
Inadequately educated  
workforce 
Philippines, 2009  26.4  Practices Informal Sector  14.8  Access to Finance  13.0  Tax Rates 
Samoa, 2009  16.9  Tax Rates  13.8  Crime, Theft & Disorder  13.8  Crime, Theft & Disorder 
Timor‐Leste, 2009  36.3  Electricity  12.7  Crime, Theft & Disorder  12.1  Access to Finance 
Tonga, 2009  20.1  Practices Informal Sector  17.0  Corruption  15.6  Tax Rates 
Vanuatu, 2009  15.7  Electricity  14.8  Access to Finance  14.3  Crime, Theft & Disorder 
Vietnam, 2009  24.7  Access to Finance  19.3  Practices Informal Sector  13.3  Transportation 
EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA                
Albania, 2007  27.7  Electricity  17.6  Practices Informal Sector  11.0  Corruption 
Armenia, 2009  21.8  Practices Informal Sector  16.0  Tax Rates  15.9  Political instability 
Azerbaijan, 2009  23.1  Access to Finance  22.2  Tax Rates  18.2  Corruption 






25.1  Political instability  18.7  Tax Rates  11.4  Practices Informal Sector 
Bulgaria, 2009  17.2  Access to Finance  15.2  Practices Informal Sector  13.3  Political instability 










15.9  Political instability  14.7  Practices Informal Sector 
Macedonia, FYR, 2009  31.3  Practices Informal Sector  26.9  Access to Finance  6.8  Political instability 
Georgia, 2008  18.0  Access to Finance  17.4  Political instability  16.4  Electricity 
Hungary, 2009  38.4  Tax Rates  24.2  Political instability  14.2  Tax Administration 
Kazakhstan, 2009  26.6  Tax Rates  15.2  Corruption  13.2  Access to Finance 
Kosovo, 2009  33.5  Electricity  20.6  Corruption  12.8  Practices Informal Sector 
Kyrgyz Republic, 2009  24.5  Electricity  19.9  Access to Finance  11.0  Practices Informal Sector 
Latvia, 2009  19.1  Tax Rates  16.7  Political instability  11.3  Tax Administration 
Lithuania, 2009  35.2  Tax Rates  12.0  Practices Informal Sector  11.4  Access to Finance 




Montenegro, 2009  18.7  Electricity  17.9  Access to Finance  12.7  Practices Informal Sector 








Russian Federation, 2009  17.2  Tax Rates  16.9  Access to Finance  15.4 
Inadequately educated  
workforce 
Serbia, 2009  20.7  Political instability  19.9  Practices Informal Sector  17.8  Access to Finance 






Slovenia, 2009  20.0  Tax Rates  19.2  Access to Finance  17.4  Practices Informal Sector 
Tajikistan, 2008  24.8  Electricity  22.5  Tax Rates  17.5  Access to Finance 
Turkey, 2008  25.9  Access to Finance  18.2  Tax Rates  17.5  Political instability 
Ukraine, 2008  23.2  Political instability  17.5  Tax Rates  10.6  Corruption 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN                
Argentina, 2006  16.5  Political instability  15.7  Access to Finance  15.4  Labor regulations 
Bolivia, 2006  30.3  Political instability  28.1  Practices Informal Sector  8.0  Corruption 
Brazil, 2009  32.8  Tax Rates  13.2  Tax Administration  12.7  Access to Finance 
Chile, 2006  18.5  Practices Informal Sector  15.3  Electricity  14.3  Crime, Theft & Disorder 
Colombia, 2006  34.6  Practices Informal Sector  12.9  Crime, Theft & Disorder  12.5  Tax Rates 
Ecuador, 2006  28.4  Political instability  18.3  Corruption  14.2  Access to Finance 
El Salvador, 2006  31.3  Crime, Theft & Disorder  15.3  Practices Informal Sector  13.3  Corruption 
Guatemala, 2006  21.0  Practices Informal Sector  20.0  Crime, Theft & Disorder  10.1  Political instability 
Honduras, 2006  19.2  Access to Finance  19.2  Corruption  15.6  Crime, Theft & Disorder 
Mexico, 2006  19.0  Practices Informal Sector  17.9  Corruption  10.6  Tax Rates 
Nicaragua, 2006  26.0  Political instability  17.3  Access to Finance  16.6  Electricity 
Panama, 2006  30.6  Electricity  14.6  Tax Rates  10.8  Corruption 
Paraguay, 2006  25.8  Practices Informal Sector  21.0  Access to Finance  14.9  Corruption 
Peru, 2006  22.1  Practices Informal Sector  17.9  Tax Administration  17.0  Political instability 




27.9  Crime, Theft & Disorder  10.0  Corruption 
SOUTH ASIA                   
Yemen, Rep., 2010  32.1  Electricity  26.6  Corruption  7.7  Political instability 
Afghanistan, 2008  20.0  Crime, Theft & Disorder  17.9  Electricity  16.8  Access to Finance 
Bhutan, 2009  21.7  Access to Finance  12.5  Tax Rates  10.5 
Inadequately educated  
workforce 
Nepal, 2009  62.1  Political instability  26.5  Electricity  2.6  Labor regulations 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys. 
 